This is a translation of this video in russian from Andrei Lankov
Setting the Global Stage: The Nuclear Order
To begin, we must place North Korea within the broader context of global nuclear politics. Following the dawn of the nuclear age, a distinct hierarchy emerged. By 1968, five nations – the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China – possessed nuclear weapons. That year, these “Big Five” formalized their status through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty essentially established a two-tiered system: the recognized nuclear-weapon states, who pledged eventual disarmament, and the non-nuclear-weapon states, who committed not to acquire such weapons, in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology. The NPT aimed to create a stable, albeit unequal, order, effectively granting a monopoly on nuclear arms to the P5.
However, this established order was not immutable. Since 1968, several nations have challenged this framework. India and Pakistan famously developed and tested nuclear weapons, refusing to sign the NPT as non-nuclear states. Israel is widely understood to possess a significant, albeit undeclared, nuclear arsenal, also outside the NPT regime. South Africa, interestingly, developed a small arsenal during the apartheid era but made the unique decision to voluntarily dismantle it before transitioning to majority rule. And then, there is North Korea – the fourth nation, chronologically, to break this P5 monopoly and develop nuclear weapons after initially joining the NPT, a point we shall return to.
Debunking Prevalent Myths
When discussing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, we often encounter two diametrically opposed, yet equally simplistic, narratives. One perspective, sometimes voiced by those sympathetic to Pyongyang or Moscow, argues that North Korea cannot truly be the impoverished nation often depicted, precisely because it succeeded in developing such advanced weaponry. They point to the immense cost and technological sophistication required, suggesting underlying economic strength.
Conversely, another common viewpoint, often held by critics, posits that North Korea is far too poor and technologically backward to have achieved this feat alone. This narrative invariably concludes that Pyongyang must have received substantial, likely clandestine, assistance, typically pointing fingers at the former Soviet Union or, less frequently, China.
As we will explore, the reality is far more nuanced. Both of these extreme interpretations fail to capture the complex truth. North Korea is, by most objective measures, an economically challenged state, especially when compared to its southern counterpart or regional neighbors. Its infrastructure, including basic elements like paved roads and railway efficiency, reflects decades of economic hardship. Yet, it did develop nuclear weapons. How?
Early Seeds and Shifting Motivations
The origins of North Korea’s nuclear interest can be traced back quite far, potentially even to the immediate aftermath of World War II. Some hypothesize that Kim Il Sung, witnessing the devastating impact of the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their role in compelling Japan’s surrender, recognized the immense strategic power conferred by nuclear weapons. While direct evidence for this early epiphany is scarce, it’s a plausible starting point.
More concretely, North Korean officials were present at Soviet nuclear tests, such as the one conducted at the Totskoye range in 1954. This direct exposure undoubtedly left a profound impression regarding the sheer destructive capability of these weapons.
Over the decades, the motivations driving the program evolved and shifted in priority:
- National Prestige: In the initial post-war period, amidst fervent nationalism and the desire to build a “great and prosperous” Korea, possessing the ultimate symbol of modern power – the atom bomb – held significant appeal. It was about joining the ranks of major powers.
- Strategic Autonomy: As ideological rifts appeared, particularly the Sino-Soviet split, Pyongyang grew wary of relying solely on its powerful patrons for security. Developing an independent deterrent became increasingly attractive as a way to ensure freedom of action and reduce vulnerability to the shifting geopolitical tides between Moscow and Beijing.
- Deterrence and Regime Survival: This became, arguably, the paramount motivation, especially from the 1990s onwards. Witnessing interventions in states that lacked a credible deterrent (like Iraq or Libya, the latter having abandoned its nuclear program), the North Korean leadership likely concluded that nuclear weapons were the ultimate guarantee against external threats and forced regime change.
- Offensive Capability/Unification: While often downplayed, the long-standing goal of unifying the Korean peninsula under Pyongyang’s control cannot be entirely dismissed. Nuclear weapons could potentially be seen as a tool to alter the military balance or coerce the South.
- Economic Bargaining Chip: Especially during periods of severe economic crisis, like the famine of the 1990s, the nuclear program proved to be a valuable asset for extracting concessions, aid (like fuel oil), and diplomatic attention from the international community.
The Foundational Role of Soviet Assistance
It is undeniable that the initial stages of North Korea’s nuclear journey were heavily reliant on Soviet support. In 1955, the Institute of Nuclear Physics was established within the North Korean Academy of Sciences. Following Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow in 1956, where nuclear cooperation was discussed, agreements were formalized in 1959 concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy and Soviet technical assistance.
Crucially, the Soviet Union undertook the training of hundreds of North Korean scientists and engineers – estimates range around 250-300 individuals – in nuclear physics and related disciplines. This transfer of human capital was perhaps the most vital contribution.
Furthermore, the Soviets were instrumental in establishing the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, often disguised under the mundane name “Yongbyon Furniture Factory.” They supplied the first research reactor, the IRT-2000, which became operational in 1965. Significantly, the initial arrangement involved the USSR providing the fuel and, critically, taking back the spent fuel rods, thereby preventing North Korea from easily extracting the plutonium produced within them. A Radiochemical Laboratory, necessary for reprocessing spent fuel, was also constructed with Soviet help, though initially subject to these controls.
Forging an Indigenous Path
Despite initial reliance, North Korea harbored ambitions for greater independence. Understanding the two primary routes to a bomb – the plutonium path (requiring reactors and reprocessing) and the highly enriched uranium (HEU) path (requiring complex enrichment technology like centrifuges) – they initially focused on the former, likely seeing it as more achievable given their existing reactor infrastructure.
A key step was the construction of a second, larger reactor at Yongbyon – a 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor. This design, interestingly, was based not on secret Soviet plans, but on publicly available British Magnox reactor blueprints, which North Korea accessed after joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. This reactor, operational by 1986, was particularly well-suited for producing weapons-grade plutonium, marking a significant step towards an indigenous weapons capability.
Parallel to this, although kept far more secret and likely beginning later (perhaps late 1980s or early 1990s), North Korea also embarked on the uranium enrichment path, seeking to master the difficult technology of gas centrifuges to produce HEU from its own natural uranium deposits.
Cycles of Crisis and Negotiation: The Agreed Framework
The 1990s brought profound changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated North Korea’s primary economic benefactor and security guarantor, plunging the country into a devastating economic crisis and famine, known as the “Arduous March.” Simultaneously, growing international suspicion about its nuclear activities, particularly the potential plutonium production at Yongbyon, led to increased pressure from the IAEA and the US.
This culminated in the First Nuclear Crisis in March 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in response to demands for special inspections. Tensions soared, military options were discussed in Washington, but ultimately, diplomacy prevailed. Through negotiations involving key figures like former President Jimmy Carter, the Geneva Agreed Framework was signed in October 1994.
This landmark, though ultimately fragile, agreement stipulated:
- North Korea would freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities (effectively halting its known plutonium program) under IAEA monitoring.
- In return, an international consortium (KEDO), primarily funded by the US, South Korea, and Japan, would construct two proliferation-resistant Light Water Reactors (LWRs) to meet North Korea’s energy needs, projected for completion by 2003.
- Crucially, pending the LWRs’ completion, KEDO would supply North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, providing vital energy relief during the famine.
- The US also committed to steps towards normalizing political and economic relations.
For North Korea, facing economic ruin, the Agreed Framework offered a lifeline – desperately needed energy resources and the prospect of future economic integration – in exchange for temporarily capping its most visible path to nuclear weapons.
The Framework’s Collapse and the Second Nuclear Crisis
The Agreed Framework, however, was built on mutual distrust. The incoming US administration of George W. Bush, influenced by neoconservative thinkers, viewed the deal with deep skepticism. In the summer of 2002, US intelligence asserted it had evidence of a covert North Korean program to enrich uranium (HEU), violating the spirit, if not the precise letter, of the 1994 agreement.
In October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted Pyongyang with this evidence. The North Korean response was ambiguous, initially denying, then allegedly admitting (a point later contested by Pyongyang). Believing their suspicions confirmed, the US suspended the crucial fuel oil shipments. This effectively killed the Agreed Framework; the promised LWRs were never completed.
Feeling betrayed and facing renewed economic pressure, North Korea responded decisively in early 2003: it restarted the frozen Yongbyon reactor, expelled IAEA inspectors, and formally and finally withdrew from the NPT. The path was now clear for an unconstrained nuclear program.
Unfettered Development and Nuclear Status
Freed from the constraints of the NPT and the Agreed Framework, North Korea dramatically accelerated its efforts on both the plutonium and uranium fronts. This led to a series of nuclear tests:
- 2006: The first test, likely a plutonium device, generally considered a partial success or even a fizzle, demonstrating intent more than mastery.
- 2009: A more successful plutonium test.
- 2013: Third test.
- 2016: Two tests within the same year.
- 2017: The sixth and most powerful test to date, which North Korea claimed was a thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb). While the exact nature is debated, its significantly higher yield was undeniable.
Alongside these underground tests, Pyongyang made rapid strides in developing ballistic missile technology, progressing from short- and medium-range missiles to testing designs potentially capable of reaching the continental United States (ICBMs). While questions remain about their ability to reliably miniaturize a warhead to fit onto these missiles and survive atmospheric re-entry, most analysts believe they have either achieved this capability or are very close.
Conclusion: A Complex Path to Nuclear Capability
Thus, North Korea stands today as a de facto nuclear state. Its journey was long and complex, spanning over half a century. It began perhaps with early notions of prestige and the strategic lessons of Hiroshima, significantly aided by initial Soviet technical and educational support. The program evolved, driven by desires for strategic independence from its allies, and ultimately solidified around the perceived necessity of nuclear weapons for regime survival and deterrence, particularly after the fall of the Soviet bloc and interventions elsewhere.
North Korea’s success, despite its economic limitations, demonstrates the power of a centralized state to concentrate national resources, however scarce, on overriding strategic priorities, sustained over generations. It also highlights a pattern of leveraging international agreements and aid, sometimes adhering to them tactically while potentially pursuing clandestine paths, and ultimately prioritizing the perceived requirements of national security and regime preservation above international norms or economic benefits derived from compliance. Understanding this history, with its shifting motivations and unique blend of external reliance and dogged indigenous effort, is crucial for comprehending the challenges the North Korean nuclear program continues to pose today.